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I defend a model of the musically extended mind. I consider how acts of “musicking”
grant access to novel emotional experiences otherwise inaccessible. First, I discuss the
idea of “musical affordances” and specify both what musical affordances are and how they
invite different forms of entrainment. Next, I argue that musical affordances – via soliciting
different forms of entrainment – enhance the functionality of various endogenous, emotion-
granting regulative processes, drawing novel experiences out of us with an expanded
complexity and phenomenal character. I argue that music therefore ought to be thought of
as part of the vehicle needed to realize these emotional experiences. I appeal to different
sources of empirical work to develop this idea.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the main reasons we listen to music is to regulate our emo-
tions (Krumhansl, 2002). Musical activity – temporally patterned
activity by which individuals or groups produce or perceive inten-
tionally structured sound (Cross, 2001; Croom, 2012, p. 2) – is
often undertaken in the service of emotion regulation. We listen
to music to elicit powerful feelings.1 And by eliciting powerful
feelings, music can function as a tool for motivating both individ-
ual and collective actions. Considerations such as these led Small
(1998) to coin the term “musicking” to stress the active character
of our musical engagements. Following Small, I will use “musick-
ing” to encompass the different ways that we actively engage with –
and indeed use – music to animate behavior, cultivate and reﬁne
affective experiences, and orient ourselves to others and the world
more generally.2
I speciﬁcally consider how musicking-in-listening enables us to
develop novel emotions and, in so doing, expand our emotional
repertoire. I argue that music does, indeed, often grant access
to novel emotions – and it does so by scaffolding and enhanc-
ing the functional complexity of certain endogenous resources,
thus granting phenomenal access to experiences that we would be
otherwise unable to develop. First, I discuss the idea of “musical
affordances” and specify both what musical affordances are and
1In what follows, I use “emotions,” “affect,” and “feelings” interchangeably. A fur-
ther clariﬁcatory point: I am not suggesting that we always use music to generate
powerful feelings. Sometimes our felt responses to music are mild – and sometimes,
non-existent. Nevertheless, musical experience plays an important role in nearly all
cultures in part because of its potential for eliciting strong individual and collective
affective responses (Juslin and Laukka, 2004; see also Becker, 2004; Bicknell, 2009;
Gabrielsson and Bradbury, 2011). Moreover, it is telling that, as far as we know, care-
givers in all cultures regularly sing to their infants as a means of emotion regulation
(Trehub and Nakata, 2001).
2Wehave beenmusicking for quite a long time. Thediscovery of musical instruments
over 35,000 years old suggest that well-established musical practices and traditions
were a central part of human life far earlier than ﬁrst thought (Conard et al., 2009).
how they invite different forms of musical engagement. Next, I
argue that musical affordances enhance the functional complex-
ity of various endogenous, emotion-granting regulative processes,
drawing novel experiences out of us with an expanded complex-
ity and phenomenal character. I appeal to different sources of
empirical work to develop this idea. In so doing, I suggest that,
since music is an essential resource needed to access these experi-
ences, it is therefore warranted to speak of the musically extended
mind.
MUSICKING AND MUSICAL AFFORDANCES
In everyday life, we do many different things with music. A com-
mon use of music is as an atmosphere-enriching sonic additive.
Dynamic beat-heavy music can elevate spirits at a party, cre-
ating a joyous atmosphere, and compelling listeners to mingle
and dance; slower reverent music – at a funeral, for instance –
can have the opposite effect, bringing about an atmosphere
of quiet grief and remembrance.3 Music can also coordinate
actions both solitary and social. In elevating our mood and
sharpening our attentional focus (Sridharan et al., 2007), music
can get us into different states of action-readiness necessary
for various activities, including combat (Gittoes, 2004; Pro-
tevi, 2010), athletics (DeNora, 1986), erotic encounters (DeNora,
1997), dining out (Caldwell and Hibbert, 1999), or studying
(Rauscher et al., 1993).
The point of these observations is that within everyday life,
music is generally not perceived merely as an esthetic object for
passive contemplation. Rather, we perceive it as a resource we can
3Of course, not all funeral ceremonies are sombre affairs – such as the often raucous,
celebratory tone of African–American funerals in the Southern Baptist tradition in
the United States. While these services may begin with mournful singing and prayer,
they often end on an extremely joyful note: an energetic celebration of the deceased’s
reunion with Christ. Even in these cases, however, the music shapes the atmosphere
of the service as it transitions from grief to joyful celebration.
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use to do different things,much the samewaywe perceive tools and
technologies as resources that help us accomplish different tasks.
Music, I suggest, is experienced as having instrumental value. And
what I suggest further is that musical affordances are what specify
the different sorts of things we can do with music. As we will see,
we are attuned and responsive to musical affordances from birth –
and probably even earlier.4
I am appropriating the term“affordances” from ecological psy-
chology, particularly the work of Gibson (1979). There is much
debate over what Gibson meant with this term, precisely, and how
best to understand it. For the purposes of this paper, we can leave
this debate to others (see, for example,Heft, 2001; Chemero,2003).
When I speak of affordances in what follows, I mean simply action
possibilities in a perceiver’s environment that are speciﬁed rela-
tionally, that is, both by (1) particular structural features of the
environment and things in it, as well as (2) the repertoire of senso-
rimotor capacities the perceiver employs to detect and respond to
these structural features. A perceiver, in virtue of being embodied
in a particular sort of way – and possessing an accumulated his-
tory of environmental interactions – will experience affordances
as furnishing different sets of interactive possibilities (cf. Shaw and
Turvey, 1981; Heft, 1989; Chemero, 2003).
For an adult human, for example, a chair (in virtue of its struc-
tural properties such as height, shape, texture, etc.) affords sitting,
standing on, or picking up; for an infant or a cat or a lizard, it
affords none of these things – but it does afford crawling or hiding
under. Different perceivers who vary in their biological, physio-
logical, morphological, and kinematic details – as well as their
goal-directed activities (Mazet, 1991) and individual histories –
will thus detect and respond to different affordances. The same
chair will exhibit perceiver-relative “activity signatures”: func-
tional properties that can be expressed as “for + verb” (e.g., a
chair is for sitting or for hiding under; cf. Beck, 1987). Accord-
ingly, for an ecological, affordance-based approach to perception,
what matters “is not merely the world in its objective qualities, but
the world as perceived by organisms” (Reybrouck, 2012, p. 394).
This relational way of thinking about how affordances are
speciﬁed is beneﬁcial. It helps to clarify how the same objec-
tive environment can furnish different meanings for different
perceivers. Again, this is because the experience of particular envi-
ronmental affordances as interactively salient will co-vary with
the details of that perceiver’s history and embodiment. As Gibson
(1979, p. 8) puts it, there is a mutuality between perceiver and
environment.
In what follows, I am mainly concerned with the per-
ceiver’s experience of affordances – the phenomenology of their
4An instrumentalist perspective on musical engagement cuts against the more cere-
bral grain of much music cognition research, according to which the primary role
of the listener is to passively contemplate the piece and, in so doing, attempt to
discern its inherent meaning (Small, 1998, p. 6). Sloboda (2005, p. 319) dismissively
terms this the “pharmaceutical model” of music consumption. It presupposes that
listeners passively receive and respond to musical stimuli in virtue of determinate
relations between musical structures and features of our psychology, analogous to
the way that taking speciﬁc drugs has determinate neurochemical and psychological
effects (see Huron, 2006 for an ingenious example of such a cerebral approach). An
instrumentalist approach, to the contrary, stresses the active role the listener plays
in shaping both how they listen to music and what they hear when they do.
sensorimotor responsiveness to affordances.5 I am particularly
interested in the way that musical affordances exhibit a kind of
felt allure (cf. Rietveld, 2008). This idea refers to the way that we
often experience music as affectively irresistible; we are drawn to
it, emotionally – often in a very powerful way – in part because we
immediately recognize it as meaningful, that is, as something with
a distinctive activity signature that we can use or do things with (cf.
Krueger, 2011a; Reybrouck, 2012). Part of music’s impact comes
via the way that it presents itself as an environmental resource
inviting interaction (both potential and actualized), from simple
affective and behavioral reactivity to more complex, synchronized
forms of engagement. The ﬁrst personal character of this affec-
tive allure thus consists in the manner that musical affordances
are, from a very early age, experienced as potentiating a delimited
range of context-sensitive responses (Rietveld, 2008, p. 977). More
on this idea as we proceed.
Considering auditory affordances is not a novel endeavor. Gib-
son (and those who follow him) speak mainly of the visual
detection of affordances. But since affordances are speciﬁed via
the perceptual pick-up of structured information in the environ-
ment, they are potentially available via any modality – including
audition. And despite the optical emphasis of most discussions of
affordances, some working within this tradition have investigated
how the perception of auditory events specify different affordances
(e.g., Warren and Verbrugge, 1984; Warren et al., 1987; Heine
and Guski, 1991; Gaver, 1993a,b; Cummins, 2009). For example,
Warren et al. (1987) found evidence for the intermodal character
of auditory event perception: in ball-bouncing tasks, the informa-
tion observers used to determine bounce height was identical in
both visual and auditory conditions (see also Kohler et al., 2002).
We will return to the intermodal character of auditory perception
below.
Nevertheless, despite this existent work on ecological acoustics,
the notion of “affordances” has not received much application in
music cognition literature generally – although there are a few
exceptions here, too (e.g., Gaver, 1993a,b; Reybrouck, 2001, 2005,
2012; Windsor, 2004; Clarke, 2005; Krueger, 2011a; Windsor and
de Bézenac, 2012). As we will see, however, the notion is valuable
within a musical context. It can help elucidate the extent to which
audition (including music listening) and action are fundamentally
interwoven (Warren et al., 1987). It also helps to clarify the infor-
mational richness of music (Parncutt, 2009) and the manner by
which musical information exerts its characteristically strong pull
on us (i.e., its affective allure) as we do things with it in everyday
life (DeNora, 2000).
Sowhat doesmusic afford the listener?6 Andwhat are the struc-
tural features of music, as perceived by the listener, that specify
these affordances? An obvious but nevertheless important initial
answer to the ﬁrst question is that music affords movement. Unlike
non-musical noise in our environment – the sound of a passing
car outside our window, say, or a slamming door, the laughter
5I am here parting ways with Gibson, who was not particularly interested in the
phenomenology of affordances (see Dreyfus and Kelly, 2007; see also Sanders, 1999;
Michaels, 2003).
6An ecological approach to music performance can also be highly illuminating (see,
e.g., Davidson and Good, 2002; Borgo, 2005), but I will here focus on the experience
of music listening.
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of children playing in the yard, or the steady murmur of water
ﬂowing through a nearby brook – music generally presents a sonic
proﬁle that invites a synchronous motor response (Clayton et al.,
2005; Bispham, 2006). This response can be as subtle as tapping
our ﬁngers or nodding our head; or it can be an elaborately chore-
ographed dance routine. While a slamming door may solicit its
own sort of motor response (e.g., a sudden grimace or ﬂinch),
that sound event does not invite synchronous and sustainedmotor
engagement ; it lacks the requisite sonic proﬁle, the relevant affor-
dances. But music often does offer such a proﬁle (in a way to be
clariﬁed momentarily).
Music in this way affords what Windsor and de Bézenac (2012,
p. 112) helpfully term “advancing behavior” : a mode of sus-
tained and responsive engagement in which the acoustic structure
of a musical event – features like cyclical patterns of rhythmic
or melodic accentuation, goal-directed tonal movements, mod-
ulation of volume or intensity, etc. – draws the listener into a
patterned response reﬂecting the dynamics of this acoustic struc-
ture. A simple example is the way that the buoyant melody of a
children’s song seems to draw a similar range of bouncy, swaying
movements of the head and trunk from those who listen to it.
To a certain extent, the morphology of our advancing behavior
mirrors the dynamics of the experienced music – although there
are, of course, individual differences in the reactive behavior we
display.
Music thus often affords responsive movements in a way most
other environmental sounds do not. But we can specify more
precisely the character of this musically solicited responsive move-
ment. As the example of the children’s melody demonstrates,
musical dynamics exert an organizational control over our motor
responses. In other words, the acoustic structure of a music event
affords a ﬁne-grained synchronization or bodily alignment with
the music. Again, a simple example is the way that we instinc-
tively start tapping our ﬁngers or nodding our heads along with
the periodic modulations of melody or rhythm of a piece of music
that catches our attention (cf. Repp, 2005). Even in these rudimen-
tary cases of everyday listening, music exhibits a strong affective
allure; it is difﬁcult to ignore it or repress our bodily responses
(Brown and Parsons, 2008), even very early in life (Haslbeck,
2004; Zentner and Eerola, 2010). From the start, we experience
music as something that naturally invites this kind of synchronized
interaction.
Music therefore affords not just movement but, crucially,
entrainment. Entrainment is a concept from complex systems the-
ory. It occurs when two or more independent oscillatory processes
are synchronized with each other, gradually adjusting toward –
and eventually locking into – a common phase and/or periodicity
(Clayton et al., 2005; Will and Turow, 2011). A classic example
of entrainment – ﬁrst identiﬁed by the Dutch physicist Christiaan
Huygens in 1665 – involves themovement of two pendulums grad-
ually coming into phase-synchrony via minute vibrations in the
walls and ﬂoor (Winfree, 2001; Bennett et al., 2002). The notion
has since been applied to multiple domains including work in
mathematics, as well as physical, biological, and social sciences.
Entrainment has been described in multiple systems and at mul-
tiple time-scales: from Asian ﬁreﬂies ﬂashing in synchrony (Buck
and Buck, 1968), human interactants synchronizing gestures, and
speech patterns (Chartrand and Bargh, 1999), to a group gradually
transitioning from random to synchronized clapping (Néda et al.,
2000). Generally, entrainment emerges via mutually modula-
tory interaction between different oscillators (e.g., two swinging
pendulums inﬂuencing one another’s movements). But the inter-
action can also be one-way, such as with human entrainment to
diurnal cycles – or music.7
Music studies have thus far made little use of the notion of
entrainment. This is surprising, as the idea seems to accord nat-
urally with how we engage with music. It seems particularly
well-suited to capture the impact that music and musical rhythms
have on the reactive behavior of embodied listeners (Will and
Turow, 2011, p. 12). Since music is a structured “sound-time
phenomenon” (Reybrouck, 2012), rhythm becomes a key compo-
nent for bodily marking the temporal development of a musical
event. Musical entrainment occurs via the behavioral coordination
resulting from an individual’s responsiveness to rhythmic signals,
such as a simple (e.g., 1:1 in-phase or anti-phase) or more com-
plex (e.g., 2:3 or 3:4) phase relations (Phillips-Silver et al., 2010; cf.
Bispham, 2006; Merker et al., 2009; Nozaradan et al., 2012). This
way of coordinating our reactive behavior to the music is a way
of bodily gearing onto musical structures. This process emerges
and takes shape as the music unfolds around us in acoustic space,
wherewe (oftenunthinkingly) coordinate ourmovementswith the
dynamics of this unfolding – much the way that a dance between
two partners emerges dynamically, in real-time, from the ongoing
interplay and synchronization of each partner’s movements and
their individual responses to what the other is doing. Temporality
is thus a key feature of musical entrainment.8
But musical entrainment also has another key feature relevant
to this discussion: affective synchrony (Phillips-Silver and Keller,
2012, p. 1; cf. Trevarthen and Malloch, 2002; Janata et al., 2012).
This notion refers to the sharing of feeling states that often emerge
when individuals entrain their movements with one another – for
example, when jointly listening to or performingmusic (Keller and
Appel, 2010), or when engaging in non-musical activities such as
simply walking in sync with a partner, or having a conversation
and (unconsciously) mimicking their postures, facial expressions,
and gestures (Hatﬁeld et al., 1993; Chartrand and Bargh, 1999;
Lakin and Chartrand, 2003; Krueger and Michael, 2012). Within
the context of musical entrainment, affective synchrony refers to
the pleasure we take simply in moving our bodies in time with
the music, letting musical rhythms (and the movements they
solicit) draw certain felt responses out of us – and, when oth-
ers are present, the pleasure we take in sharing this process (i.e., of
getting into the “groove” together; Pressing, 2002; Madison, 2006;
Janata et al., 2012; cf. Schutz, 1951). Affective synchrony in this
way seems to be a central part of the affective allure of musicking.
We engage with music because, unlike most other non-musical
sounds, it affords synchronously organizing our reactive behavior
and felt responses; and we take pleasure in letting music assume
7Although, strictly speaking, our engagement with music is not really one-way since,
as we will see, the experiential character of the music-as-perceived – as well as the
sort of reactive behavior we experience the music as affording – is shaped by the
form of our “advancing behaviour.”
8The allure of music as a resource for entraining is not necessarily conﬁned to
human perceivers (see Patel et al., 2009).
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someof these organizational and regulative functions that, in other
contexts, normally fall within the scope of our own endogenous
capacities. In other words, we “ofﬂoad” some of these regulative
processes onto the music and let it do some of the work organizing
our emotional responses for us.9
Via soliciting entrainment responses,music thus exerts an orga-
nizational control over the form and dynamics of our embodied
musical engagements. This is reﬂected in the way that different
styles of music invite different patterns of entrainment with their
own unique temporal signature and affective synchrony. Entrain-
ment responses that ﬁt Tango or Salsa, for example, may differ
signiﬁcantly – as will those more organically aligned with the
acoustic structure of different musical genres like Pop, Coun-
try, Electronic, or Post-Rock.10 The spatiotemporal movements
of our entrainment responses to music are thus organized in a way
that reﬂects the hierarchically organized rhythmic and melodic
structure of the music (Windsor and de Bézenac, 2012, pp. 112–
113; cf. Leman, 2008; Burger et al., 2013). The pitch intervals
and contour of melody, for instance, establish trajectories through
mental representations of pitch space that – at least potentially
– map cross-modally onto movement possibilities within phys-
ical space (Phillips-Silver and Keller, 2012, p. 2; cf. Eitan and
Granot, 2006; Rusconi et al., 2006; Lidji et al., 2007; Eitan andTim-
mers, 2010). Phenomenologically, we feel certain movements to be
more contextually appropriate than others, relative to metrical
and melodic patterning within musical structures. For exam-
ple, while the triple meter of the waltz is not experienced as
affording marching – trying to march to a waltz feels somehow
odd, as though the music is working against us and our bod-
ily gestures are not “ﬁtting into” the appropriate musical cues
– a duple meter at the correct tempo would establish a differ-
ent entrainment context, one in which marching responses do
feel more appropriate (Windsor and de Bézenac, 2012, p. 113).
The acoustic structure of the music-as-heard thus determines
the form of our musical advancing behavior; it shapes how we
interact with and “inhabit” the music, experientially, and what
we do with it (cf. Leman and Naveda, 2010; Naveda and Leman,
2010).11
So what is it about music that affords entrainment? I have con-
sidered this idea in some detail elsewhere (Krueger, 2011a). For
our purposes, we can answer this question brieﬂy. The salient
structural features are musical features that contribute to its
dynamic quality: its character as temporally extended, spatially
and acoustically complex sound event exhibiting its own inter-
nal organizational coherence, its own compositional logic. The
9In the embodied cognition literature, “ofﬂoading” refers to the manner by which
we overcome cognitive limitations (e.g., limits on attention and working memory)
by exploiting our environment in a strategic way to reduce our cognitive workload.
For example, we post sticky notes on the side of our computer monitor or place a
box full of cans bound for the recycling bin by the front door as a memory prompt.
In these cases, we ofﬂoad information onto the environment for later recall so that
we can conserve our resources for more immediate tasks (cf. Kirsh, 1995; Wilson,
2002).
10Musical features alone do not determine the “ﬁt” of entrainment responses. Cul-
tural norms also play an important role here (Cross, 2001; Hannon and Trainor,
2007).
11For more on the idea of experientially inhabiting musical spaces, (see Krueger,
2009, 2011b).
particular structural features that comprise musical dynamics are
many, and quite varied: cyclical patterns of rhythmic or melodic
accentuation, goal-directed tonal movements, modulation of vol-
ume, intensity, cadence, or tempo, etc. This is but a partial list;
there are other features of music that potentially contribute to
its dynamism. The point is that these qualities – and many more
like them – are what imbue music with its “aliveness,” its vitality
– and its ability to summon impressions of movement, expres-
sion, and spatiality (Molnar-Szakacs and Overy, 2006; cf. Krueger,
2011a,b). In other words, they are structural features of music that
determine it to be an event that unfolds dynamically and coher-
ently in acoustic space and time, and which – when paired with
an appropriately sensitive listener – thus affords speciﬁc forms
of interaction and motor entrainment. Again, we cannot entrain
with non-musical sounds – or rather, at least not with the same
degree of reactive complexity – precisely because they lack the
dynamics and organizational coherence of music. Theirs is a sonic
proﬁle that does not specify well-articulated and, crucially, varied
entrainment possibilities – that is, possibilities for musicking.12
AFFORDANCES, MUSICKING, AND THE EXTENDED MIND
I now want to consider the way that music and musical affor-
dances grant access to kinds of experiences otherwise inaccessible.
The speciﬁc idea I want to defend is this: at times, music serves as
an external (i.e., outside-the-head) resource that can profoundly
augment, and ultimately extend, certain endogenous capacities.
When we engage in bouts of musicking, we potentially use music
to become part of an integrated brain–body–music system –
and within this extended system, musical affordances provide
resources and feedback that loop back onto us and, in so doing,
enhance the functional complexity of various motor, attentional,
and regulative capacities responsible for generating and sustaining
emotional experience. It is thus sensible to speak of the musically
extended (emotional) mind.
To head off an immediate worry, music does not necessar-
ily express or represent neatly articulated emotions; perhaps it
does not represent emotions at all.13 Whether or not music can
be said to properly represent emotions is a heated debate; it
12I invite the reader sceptical of this musical vs. non-musical contrast to compare
the experience of entraining with the steady pulsing of a car alarm, say, or ticking
of a clock with that of any random pop music hit. We can, of course, entrain with
non-musical sounds. But I am conﬁdent that, for most of us – congenital amusiacs
excluded (Ayotte et al., 2002) – the experiential character of entraining with music
is to experience it as potentiating a range of reactive responses that far exceeds those
of a car alarm or clock. Again, this potentiating character is part of what speciﬁes
music’s uniquely potent affective allure. Of course, pieces within some musical
genres (e.g., avant-garde jazz, noise-based avant-garde rock, minimal electronic
ambient, etc.) lack a well-articulated rhythmic structure and thus may initially
seem to present fewer entrainment possibilities than others (e.g., radio-friendly
pop music). A seasoned listener, however, may eventually discern subtle variations
in texture, tempo, or modulations of volume and intensity that suggest creative
entrainment possibilities; this possibility of perpetual discovery is surely one of the
reasons why the same piece of music remains sonically compelling across multiple
listens. However, we must also concede that there may be instances where certain
pieces present no entrainment possibilities whatsoever – but we are nevertheless
still inclined to speak of them as music. I have no intention of placing a priori
constraints on what counts as music by suggesting that all music, insofar as it is to
count as “music,” must of necessity provide entrainment possibilities. I am grateful
for two reviewers pressing me on this point.
13Although in virtue of its dynamic quality, music may represent or mirror some-
thing analogous to the way that we bodily express emotions in the kinematics
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need not concern us here (see, e.g., Kivy, 1989; Robinson, 2005;
Zangwill, 2007). Rather, following Sloboda, I instead afﬁrm the
idea that“the so-called power of musicmay verywell be in its emo-
tional cue-impoverishment. It is a kind of emotional Rorschach
blot” (Sloboda, 2000, p. 26). On the affordance-based concep-
tion of music I am here advocating, music is conceived of as an
information-rich perceptual object. But representations of emo-
tions need not be part of its informational structure. Rather, what
matters is that music affords a sonic proﬁle enabling the listener to
use it to cultivate and reﬁne speciﬁc emotional experiences. Music,
when being used by the engaged listener, therefore becomes part
of the extended vehicle by which these experiences are realized.
Framed thusly, I am intentionally situating this affordance-
based approach to music listening within discussions of the
extended mind thesis (Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 2008;
cf. Chemero, 2009; Menary, 2010), or the hypothesis of extended
cognition (HEC), as it is sometimes called. According to HEC, the
vehicles of cognition need not be conﬁned to the head. Within
certain circumstances, artifacts, tools, technologies, cultural insti-
tutions – and perhaps even other people – can become part of
a spatially extended cognitive system in virtue of the active role
they play in driving various cognitive processes such as reasoning,
remembering, planning, calculating, perceiving, and navigating
our environment, etc.
One way to think about HEC is therefore to understand it as a
theory of access.Without the ongoing, active contribution of exter-
nal resources, we cannot access the different cognitive functions
they support. For example, certain mathematical calculations are
only accessible with the aid of external props such as a pen and
paper, calculator, or computer; similarly, storage devices (books,
maps, cloud computing services, stories and cultural narratives,
sticky notes on computer monitors) give us access to short- and
long-term recall that far exceeds our native biological capacities
(Clark, 2003). When we integrate our biological capacities with
these external resources, we thus extend – in a very literal sense –
our endogenous function andbecomepart of an increasingly com-
plex, functionally and spatially expanded cognitive system (cf.
Sutton, 2006; Wilson and Clark, 2009). We access new and more
powerful forms of cognition.
Discussions of HEC have only recently begun to move beyond
a consideration of the lone agent ﬁddling with different bits of his
material environment to consider the possibility of both interper-
sonally and emotionally extended cognition (see, e.g., Gallagher,
2013; Krueger, submitted; Slaby, forthcoming; Stephan et al.,
2014). This expanded perspective on HEC is a welcome devel-
opment. Cognition rarely (if ever) proceeds independently of
emotions and affect; and it is, moreover, always situated in encom-
passing social and cultural ecosystems, comprised of constantly
evolving cultural practices, that profoundly shape its manner of
functioning (Hutchins, 2008). Considering music as a rich affec-
tive and sociocultural resource can help further motivate this new
orientation.
of our gait, posture, gestures, facial expressions, vocalisations, etc. (cf. Molnar-
Szakacs and Overy, 2006; Juslin and Västfjäll, 2008). But this claim is distinct
from saying that music represents the emotion itself. I return brieﬂy to this idea
below.
MUSICKING AS EXTERNALLY DRIVEN REGULATION
I have suggested that acting upon musical affordances can poten-
tially enhance the functional complexity of various motor, atten-
tional, and regulative capacities responsible for generating and
sustaining emotional experience. It should be noted that, while
we can mark a conceptual distinction between these three dimen-
sions of musicking, these are nevertheless artiﬁcial distinctions.
In real-world musicking, these dimensions are interrelated: the
motor dimension of music listening impacts attention – sponta-
neously nodding along to a musical rhythm, for instance, is a kind
of motorically motivated attending to particular sound elements –
and both are ultimately modulated by music’s external regulatory
force. So, while I occasionally focus on individual dimensions of
musicking in isolation, I will in what follows also try to highlight
their interrelation.
We can begin by reemphasizing the extent to which musical
experiences are enactive, multimodal processes involving the inte-
gration of perception and action (Molnar-Szakacs and Overy,
2006; Krueger, 2009, 2011b). This is not just the case for musi-
cal performance. Clearly when performing music, the different
sensorimotor strategies we use to engage with the instrument are
enhanced by the affordances unique to that instrument; there are
certain movements and acts of sound creation unique to a guitar,
trumpet, or xylophone. Within the context of musical perfor-
mance, agent and instrument form a coupled system in which
morphologies of movement and musical structure are mutually
constraining (cf. Baily, 1992; Davidson, 2012; Thompson and
Luck, 2012).
But a similar principle also applies to music listening. We have
already observed how readily music draws movement out of us:
from simply tapping our ﬁngers to participating in an elaborately
choreographed dance or music-fueled religious ritual, musical
experience is multimodal (Iyer, 2002; Janata et al., 2012). And by
soliciting different forms of movement, music functions as a real-
time emotion regulator. It solicits – and crucially, modulates the
general shape of – attention and expressive behavior responsive
for generating speciﬁc affective experiences (cf. Damasio, 1994;
Holstege et al., 1996; Niedenthal, 2007).
Consider ﬁrst how we use music to facilitate activities like exer-
cise or manual labor (Karageorghis and Terry, 1997; Robinson,
2005, pp. 395–405). Music is known to sharpen and sustain our
attentional focus (Sridharan et al., 2007), which can be helpful
when working through strenuous activity. More strikingly, how-
ever, music can also reduce how difﬁcult strenuous activity feels.
It does so not simply by masking unpleasant proprioceptive feed-
back one gets during strenuous exertions – that is, by directing
our attention away from unpleasant sensations – or by provid-
ing a calming effect that reduces muscle tension and increases
oxygenation (although these consequences are likely part of its efﬁ-
cacy). Additionally, and more pertinent to this discussion, music
can function as a kind of surrogate agency: a “musical agency”
(Fritz et al., 2013). It directly modulates reactive behavior and
affect (“emotional motor control”) on the listener’s behalf by pro-
viding ongoing feedback in the form of “virtual goals”: dynamic
representations of movement-possibilities “with anticipatable but
adaptable endpoints”that enable listeners to“regulate andmonitor
the extent and the timing of their movements more effectively”
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(Fritz et al., 2013). In short, music assumes an external regula-
tive function. Rhythmic structures, in particular, keep time for the
listener and contour the shape of musically induced bodily expres-
sions and movement patterns (i.e., via rhythmic accentuations,
increased or decreased tempo, etc.) that propel them through
their strenuous activity. In these cases, the listener ofﬂoads certain
regulative functions onto the music; instead of attending to this
time-keeping, action-monitoring information herself, she allows
themusic to tell her bothwhen andhow to act. Alongwithwhatever
additional positive physiological effects music may have, then, this
ofﬂoading reduces the listener’s cognitive burden and, predictably,
lowers her feeling of perceived exertion since she now has one less
thing to worry about and can thus direct her attention elsewhere.
As a point of contrast, consider how dramatically one’s mood
and behavior is altered – and how difﬁcult the strenuous activity
suddenly becomes – when this ofﬂoading possibility is suddenly
unavailable: for example, when one’s MP3 player abruptly shuts
off in the middle of a workout due to a dead battery (cf. Lim et al.,
2009).
Looking at concrete instances such as this of how we use music
in everyday life reinforces how deeply movement and music lis-
tening are interrelated. But to further understand the motoric
dimension of musicking, we must note that music does not merely
cause us to move and feel in particular ways. The causal chain does
not simply proceed in a tidy linear fashion from music (as heard)
to action (as caused by heard music). It also runs the other way.
The experience of agency is intrinsic to how we hear and respond
to music. In other words, as the case discussed above suggests,
there is an irreducibly interactive dimension to music perception
– even when “passively” listening.
This idea is conﬁrmed by other empirical studies. In one
of them, Chen et al. (2008) found that subjects who listened
to musical rhythms with the knowledge that they would soon
be asked to tap along with these rhythms showed activity
in the supplementary motor area, mid-premotor cortex, and
cerebellum. However, “naïve” subjects – subjects unaware that
they, too, would soon be asked to tap along – displayed the
same activity; passive listening (i.e., listening without antici-
pation) recruited the same motor regions. It seems that, even
for listeners not overtly engaged in behaviorally responding to
music, musical affordances were nevertheless perceived as solic-
iting engagement. Other studies likewise support the idea that
the motor system is involved in processing musical rhythms
(see, e.g., Sakai et al., 1999; Grahn and Brett, 2007; cf. Kohler
et al., 2002). They also suggests that the experience of agency
and bodily movement plays a role in shaping the perceptual
character of music-as-heard – even, once again, during sup-
posedly passive listening episodes (Phillips-Silver and Trainor,
2005).
These studies, and others like them, suggest that we quite
literally hear music through movement. Perceived motor poten-
tialities are a central feature of our musical “advancing behavior”
(Windsor and de Bézenac, 2012); they frame how music is brought
to phenomenal presence as music. It is telling to observe how the
phenomenology of musicking is altered when motor potentiali-
ties are no longer a part of the listening experience. In cases of
congenital amusia (Ayotte et al., 2002) – the inability to recognize
musical melody, time-changes, or discriminate pitch despite oth-
erwise normal hearing – music is experienced as presenting a
very different sort of sonic proﬁle. Total amusiacs report that
they experience music as having a highly disagreeable character: it
may sound like a car screeching or the banging of pots and pans
(Sacks, 2007, pp. 98–119). Accordingly, the phenomenal character
of their musicking experience is very different from that of the
non-amusiac in that they fail to detect musical affordances; they
are not attuned to music’s affective allure and thus do not experi-
ence it as potentiating a range of entrainment responses. This lack
of responsiveness is born out in studies showing that amusiacs
have great difﬁculty synchronizing bodily movements with music,
despite an otherwise normal ability to synchronize with sequences
of non-musical sounds (Dalla Bella and Peretz, 2003; cf. Krueger,
2009, pp. 118–121).
We thus hear music qua music through the motor potentialities
it affords. But again, to return to an earlier point, music clearly
also solicits movement, different forms of entrainment (both vol-
untary and involuntary) that shape what we hear, how we hear
it, and how we respond emotionally. For example, listeners in
one study exhibited spontaneous facial mimicry when presented
with auditory-visual presentations of emotional singing (Chan
et al., 2013). Happy singing elicited happy facial expressions, sad
singing elicited sad expressions. But this effect does not rely upon
the observation of another person. More strikingly, spontaneous
facial expressions were also observed in individuals listening to
expressive non-vocal music (Witvliet and Vrana, 1996; Lundqvist
et al., 2009). These motor solicitations appear to occur from our
earliest exposure tomusic. Infants discriminatemusical fromnon-
musical sounds: they coordinate their reactive behavior to the
former but not the latter (Trainor and Heinmiller, 1998; Zent-
ner and Kagan, 1998; Nawrot, 2003). Even neonates and preterm
infants bodily entrain with sung lullabies and consonant music,
syncing respiratory patterns, sucking (both rhythm and inten-
sity), tongue and mouth protrusions, eye opening and closing, and
vocalizations along with the rising and falling of melodic contour
(Haslbeck, 2004; cf. Krueger, 2013a). This entrainment has cogni-
tive and emotional signiﬁcance. It leads to greater equilibrium
between endogenous and exogenous processes, buttressing the
infant’s attentional and behavioral organization and promoting
stabilization of affect (DeNora, 2000, p. 79).
For our purposes, there are two important points here. First,
our engagement with music is always reciprocal and interactive.
Even when “passively” listening, we are, in fact, not really passive
listeners. Rather, we are active perceivers: we latch onto musical
affordances and respond, motorically, to the solicitations of these
affordances – even if this response is at times involuntary. And cru-
cially, the way we latch onto musical affordances determines the
phenomenal shape of how the music comes back to us, so to speak,
how the music is constituted, perceptually (cf. Phillips-Silver and
Trainor, 2005). Again, recall how dramatically the phenomenal
shape of music changes when motor potentialities are absent (e.g.,
as with amusia). The amusiac and non-amusiac may be said to lis-
ten to the same piece of music considered purely as a sonic object.
But what they hear in the music and what they get out of it will
differ greatly. For amusiacs, music is perceptually encountered as a
sonically impenetrable object ; for non-amusiacs, it is perceptually
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encountered as a structured acoustic landscape affording various
forms of reactive behavior. Motor potentialities thus partially con-
stitute the perceptual character of the music-as-heard. And via
motor entrainment, we can be said to integrate with musical affor-
dances in a dynamic, two-way relation of continuous reciprocal
causation (Clark, 1997, p. 165): what we hear determines how we
respond, which shapes what we hear, which informs our further
responses, etc. Motor entrainment is one of the mechanisms that
secures this ongoing, mutually modulatory integration.14
Second, these studies also support the idea that acting
with musical affordances potentially enhances the functional-
ity of various micro-practices responsible for emotional expe-
rience and self-regulation. Via the iterative cycles of motor
entrainment that emerge within the music-listener system, ongo-
ing feedback/feedforward loops are generated that have reg-
ulatory signiﬁcance at both the neural and behavioral level.
Without the ongoing input from these musical affordances,
however, these regulatory processes would not emerge –
much the same way we cannot access certain cognitive func-
tions (e.g., working out long multiplication problems) in the
absence of ongoing feedback from the relevant external props
(e.g., pen and paper; cf. McClelland and Rumelhart, 1986).
Musical dynamics thus provide external scaffolding support-
ing the synchronic emergence of novel music-speciﬁc experi-
ences.
At the neural level, the perception of musical gestures – rhyth-
mic structures and melodic contour, which replicate the dynamics
of human movement and emotional expression – may create a
simulation of an emotional state in the listener (Gridley and Hoff,
2006). Two brain regions, the posterior inferior frontal gyrus
and the anterior insula, are commonly activated during musi-
cally evoked emotional states (Koelsch and Siebel, 2005; Menon
and Levitin, 2005; Koelsch, 2010). Molnar-Szakacs and Overy
(2006) propose that these structures are part of the simulation
mechanism by which music communicates emotion to the lis-
tener. We hear the music as articulating dynamics akin to human
emotional expressions and we (involuntarily) create a motor
14Clark himself appeals to musical examples to support this idea. He tells us that
“continuous reciprocal causation [is not] a rare or exceptional case in human prob-
lem solving. The players in a jazz trio, when improvising, are immersed in just
such a web of causal complexity. Each member’s playing is continually responsive
to the others’ and at the same time exerts its own modulatory force” (Clark, 1997, p.
165). It should be noted, however, that the continuous reciprocal causation found
in music listening has a somewhat different structure than prototypical cases of
extended cognition. Unlike Otto recording new information in his notebook or a
jazz musician actively modulating her partner’s performance, there is no analogous
environmental manipulation; rather, the relevant changes take place in the listener
(i.e., their experience of the music as affording different forms of entrainment and
emotion regulation). Nevertheless, it is not clear that this difference threatens the
prospects for genuine integration (and subsequent extension). For, what is required,
I suggest, is not necessarily the presence of a genuine material change (i.e., of the
music considered as a thing in the world) but rather an informational change – that
is, the way that affectively salient resources in the music-as-perceived are detected
and acted on, and what sort of downstream modulatory impact they have on shap-
ing the listener’s further reactive behaviour, which in turn shapes how different
affordances are detected, etc. Like the information in Otto’s notebook, this infor-
mation is “stored” in an external resource; and it is similarly poised to provide
real-time cognition-enhancing, behaviour-guiding resources for a suitably attuned
and responsive listener (cf. Clark, 2010). This is a complicated issue, however, and
requiresmuchmore discussion than I can here give it. I amvery grateful to a reviewer
for pressing for further clarity on this point.
representation of that emotion within ourselves. The dynamics
of musical gestures in these cases integrate with the listener’s rele-
vant neural mechanisms, giving rise to autonomic and somatic
responses that generate associated emotional responses, both
physiological and phenomenological (Overy and Molnar-Szakacs,
2009).
At the behavioral level, music, as we have seen, solicits differ-
ent forms of gestural and postural entrainment – overt physical
expressions (e.g., facial expressionswhen listening to happymusic)
that induce the felt experience of emotions (cf. Ekman et al., 1983;
Niedenthal, 2007). There is a great deal of empirical evidence indi-
cating a reciprocal relation between an emotional experience and
its behavioral expression. Simply adopting emotion-speciﬁc facial
expressions or postures, for example, is often sufﬁcient to bring
about the associated experience (see Laird, 2007 for an overview).
What is relevant for our purposes is that musical affordances scaf-
fold our access to these emotions by quite literally pulling these
emotion-inducing responses out of us (cf. Burger et al., 2013).
But music’s impact does not stop there. By continuing to provide
ongoing feedback, music serves as a real-time regulator: the tem-
poral structure and periodic modulations of the music (melody,
rhythm, volume, intensity, etc.) in its unfolding regulates the form
that our physical expressions take (cf. Windsor and de Bézenac,
2012).15 In short, the music shapes our reactive behavior in a
ﬁne-grained way. Musical input (in the form of dynamic musical
gestures) gives expressive shape to our reactive behavior, much the
way that ongoing input from a dance partner extends, transforms
– and in an important sense, completes – the shape of our own
partner-dependent responses. The overt physiological and postu-
ral changes these musical gestures induce – and which arise via
the auditory-motor integration characteristic of our perceptual
engagement with these affordances – thus provide afferent feed-
back enhancing and transforming our affective state. When the
music lifts, so do our expressive responses and the emotional states
they induce; when it falls, so do we (cf. Witvliet and Vrana, 1996;
Lundqvist et al., 2009). In manipulating our behavioral responses
via patterns of entrainment, music thus manipulates our emo-
tional experience by assuming a critical regulative function. We
let music do some of the emotional work for us. And to return to
an earlier point, this ofﬂoading is, I propose, a central part of the
pleasurable“letting go”experience we tend associate with episodes
deep listening: heightened experiences of music listening in which
we feel as thoughwe are experientially consumed by, and somehow
taken up into, the music as it unfolds around us and leads us on
a sonic and affective journey (Krueger, 2009, 2011b; cf. Bicknell,
2009; Gabrielsson and Bradbury, 2011). Within these experiences,
we become acutely aware of the way that “musical agency” (Fritz
et al., 2013) profoundly augments, extends, and organizes our own
affective resources.
In sum, I suggest that, as with the performer–instrument rela-
tion, listener and music similarly form an integrated system (cf.
Reybrouck, 2012). Within this system, the listener uses music (via
15Recall the earlier discussion of music and strenuous activity, as well as the discus-
sion of how the acoustic structure of speciﬁc musical styles (Salsa, Tango, Post-Rock,
Electronic, etc.) affords complementary patterns of entrainment with their own
unique temporal signatures and affective synchrony.
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musical affordances) as a kind of “esthetic technology” (DeNora,
2000) for regulating and transforming their behavior, attention,
and emotion. In this sense, then, can music – when integrated
with an appropriately responsive listener – function as an external
cognitive and affective resource. Via processes of synchronization
and bodily entrainment, music takes over some of the regulatory
functions normally associated with subject-centered endogenous
processes. When we attentively engage with music, we ofﬂoad this
cognitive function onto the music, much the way we do various
memory functions onto environmental artifacts like notebooks
and calendar apps in smartphones – and in so doing, enhance
our cognitive performance. Music similarly affords this sort of
externally driven regulation.
MUSICKING AND NOVEL EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES
Musical ofﬂoading potentially expands our affective repertoire and
open ups new forms of experience. In adults, musical affordances
enhance the functionality of endogenous process by providing
additional regulative properties – properties which the listener
exploits to access a more nuanced means of emotional reﬁnement,
attention, and expression than, say, the relatively coarse-grained
possibilities offered by facial expressions, gestures, or postural
adjustments (cf. Niedenthal, 2007). This nuance is reﬂected in
how we tend to speak about music and its ongoing impact on the
listener: its affective power, vitality, and seemingly inﬁnite ability to
convey a range of subtle feelings and expressions. Musical expres-
sions of emotions can have, for instance, increased complexity,
temporal range, subtlety, and force in contrast to their non-musical
counterparts (Cochrane, 2008, p. 338). These properties help to
explain why, when listening attentively to a piece of music, we
often feel as though we have temporarily accessed a realm of feel-
ing and expression that somehowgoes beyond that of our everyday
non-musical life; it also helps explain why musical expressions of
emotion can seem simultaneously familiar and alien.16 When we
integrate with music via musical affordances, we thus gain access
to this expanded expressive palette, much the way that dancing
with a highly skilled partner provides ongoing feedback that, for a
time, at least, elevates one’s own dancing. As a result, we are able to
temporarily access musically scaffolded forms of experience and
expression that we cannot access outside of this music-listener
system.
This is vividly demonstrated by looking at the narratives of
those living with Moebius syndrome, a congenital form of bilat-
eral facial paralysis (Cole, 1998; Briegel, 2006; Cole and Spalding,
2009). Since people with Moebius syndrome have no facial ani-
mation, they are unable to facially articulate emotions. They often
report a diminishment or loss of emotion and affect that they
feel results from their lack of facial expressivity (Cole, 2009). For
example, one individual with Moebius writes that, “I think there’s
a lot of dissociation [from emotional experience]. But I think I
get trapped in my mind or my head. I sort of think happy or I
think sad, not really saying or recognizing actually feeling happy
or feeling sad. . .I have to say this thought is a happy thought and
16Similar intuitions likely led Schopenhauer to declare music alone among the arts
uniquely capable of providing access to the essence of the world in itself (i.e., the
world as pure “will”; Schopenhauer, 2011).
therefore I am happy”; another tells us that, “I did not express
emotion. I am not sure I felt emotion, as a deﬁned concept. . .I
don’t think I was happy, or even had the concept of happiness as a
child” (Cole, 2009, pp. 353–354).
These narratives appear to lend support to the previously
discussed link between emotional experience and its behavioral
expression (Laird, 2007; Niedenthal, 2007). But they are also inter-
esting in virtue of what they tell us about the various compensatory
strategies people with Moebius syndrome adopt (Bogart et al.,
2012; Bogart et al., in press; Krueger and Michael, 2012). Since
people with Moebius syndrome cannot use their face to express
emotion, they often utilize other resources and strategies: modu-
lating their tone of voice, intentionally speaking in a loud and clear
voice, speaking candidly about their feelings, using humor, exag-
gerated gestures, touching, or employing various props or articles
of clothing (e.g., a smiley face pin on the a jacket lapel; Bogart et al.,
2012). These strategies involve recruiting compensatory strategies
for expressing emotions to others. But people with Moebius syn-
drome also utilize compensatory strategies to experience emotion
– and a common feature of their narratives is their reliance upon
art and music in this regard (2009). The experience of both per-
forming and listening to music seems in particular to be a means
of accessing certain emotional and affective experiences – or at
least emotional and affective experiences of a certain phenomenal
quality or intensity – that, in virtue of their facial paralysis, they
cannot otherwise access.17 One way to understand music’s efﬁ-
cacy in helping people with Moebius syndrome recalibrate their
emotional phenomenology is, once again, to appeal to emotional
ofﬂoading. People with Moebius syndrome ofﬂoad certain regu-
latory and expressive functions onto the music – regulatory and
expressive functions which they lack – and in so doing allow the
music to scaffold experiences of a kind and degree that would
otherwise remain inaccessible. Musical agency provides surrogate
regulative functionality.
For all listeners, music can also scaffold our access to novel
emotional and affective experiences by shaping our perception and
experience of time. We tend to experience time as passing more
slowly during sustained engagement with emotionally compelling
music (Kellaris andKent, 1992; Schäfer et al., 2013). This expanded
sense of temporal presence offers additional regulative function-
ality. It allows us to attend more carefully, and in unaccustomed
ways, to the development and modulation of our music-enhanced
emotions. As an esthetic technology, music augments emotional
expression and exploration. Again, when we engage with music,
we potentially access an expanded horizon of regulative possibil-
ities that bring with them a richer palate of emotional expression
and experience than we could access purely by appealing to our
own internal (i.e., non-musically enhanced) resources.
The regulatory functionality that musical affordances provide
can also have a profound impact on the cognitive development and
performance of children and young infants. In the case of young
17This is not to suggest that peoplewithMoebius syndrome live utterly impoverished
emotional lives. Far from it. The point, rather, is that certain emotional experiences
seems to be diminished in virtue of their loss of facial expressivity. But even here,
these experiences can be compensated for by adopting various alternative strategies
available both to the person with Moebius as well as to those they interact with
(Bogart et al., 2012).
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listeners, musical engagement can augment cognitive processes
and emotional experiences that far exceed their current level of
endogenous development. For example, background music has
been shown to assist students with various developmental and
learning disabilities by helping them to regulate their emotions,
enhance motor coordination, and organize the attention needed
to sustain task focus (e.g., Cripe, 1986; Hallam and Price, 1998;
Savan, 1999).
More striking, however, is the impact that music has on
very young perceivers (neonates and preterm infants) in terms
of giving them access to elevated cognitive and affective com-
petence. Neonates lack the neurobiological resources needed
to self-regulate endogenous control of attention, emotion, and
behavior (for details, see Rothbart, 1989; Gopnik, 2009, pp. 106–
123). Accordingly, because their attention is largely exogenous
(i.e., world-determined) at this stage of their development, they
are extremely vulnerable to environmental perturbations. The
input of caregivers thus becomes extremely important in man-
aging their attention and stabilizing their affect. Caregivers assist
infants here by employing a range of different physical strategies
(exaggerated movements, gestures, and facial expressions; manip-
ulating gaze, body orientation; “infant-directed” speech consisting
of raised pitch, slowed tempo, elongated vowels, and slow pitch
contours with large frequency ranges) designed to actively mod-
ulate the attentional and affective character of early interactions
in a way that is vital for the infant’s social-cognitive development
(Stern, 1985; Tronick, 2005; cf. Krueger, 2013b). However, musical
affordances can, as we saw previously, integrate with the infant’s
native interest in and responsiveness to music and provide sur-
rogate endogenous function, organizing attention, behavior, and
affect in a way that exceeds their current level of development.
For example, not only do infants display an evaluative prefer-
ence for consonant over dissonant music, in that the former guides
their attention toward it while the latter repels it (Trainor and
Heinmiller, 1998, p. 83). Additionally, they latch onto affordances
speciﬁc to the former in order to regulate their internal states and
bring about a more inquisitive and emotionally balanced state
in relation to their environment (Zentner and Kagan, 1998). In
Zentner and Kagan’s study, the infants actively engaging with con-
sonant music fretted less, exhibited slower and more controlled
motor activity (i.e., they were less ﬁdgety while absorbed in the
music) and vocalized more (i.e., expressed interest in the music)
than when listening to dissonant music or non-musical sounds.
In short, they exhibited signiﬁcantly enhanced behavioral, atten-
tional, and emotional organization within a speciﬁcally musical
context. Haslbeck (2004) similarly found that pre-term infants
entrained bodily movements (sucking, tongue and mouth protru-
sions, eye opening and closing), respiratory patterns, and alerting
responses with consonant music (in this case, lullabies) and, in so
doing, exhibited a heightened regulatory competence speciﬁc to
the music therapeutic context. In these cases, the music does more
than provide sensory input to be processed by the infant’s internal
resources. Rather, it assumes an external regulative function that
determines the infant’s behavior and affective responses. The dis-
tributed listener–music dynamics of this ongoing, mutually mod-
ulatory exchange are where the infant (for a time, at least) is able
to realize novel musically enhanced cognitive and emotional feats.
CONCLUSION
I have argued for a picture of the musically extended mind.
I sketched a picture of “musical affordances” and argued that,
in some circumstances, musical dynamics provided ongoing
resources and feedback that enhance the functional complexity
of various motor, attentional, and regulative capacities responsi-
ble for generating and sustaining emotional experience. A cascade
of neural and behavioral entrainment responses are what secure
the sort of sustained integration with musical affordances needed
to bring about music-speciﬁc regulatory processes. In these cases,
I claimed, specifying the nature of the relevant processes – and
the emotions they give rise to – requires that we look beyond the
boundary of the individual.
I do not claim to have conclusively defended the existence
of a musically extended emotional mind. More work would
need to be done – for example, to specify why an extended
way of thinking about musically induced emotions is explana-
torily superior to adopting a more conservative situated approach
(cf. Rupert, 2004; Sprevak, 2010). I would also need to explic-
itly address the much-discussed coupling-constitution objection
(Adams and Aizawa, 2001, 2008): the objection that, just because
a given cognitive process is causally dependent upon an envi-
ronmental process, it does not follow that the environmental
processes thereby becomes a constitutive part of the causal pro-
cess. I have responded to this objection elsewhere (Krueger,
2012). For what it is worth, I do not ﬁnd this objection as
formidable as is often assumed, in part because it strikes me
as dangerously close to being question-begging (see, e.g., Hur-
ley, 2010; Ross and Ladyman, 2010; Kagan and Lassiter, 2013).
But that is a discussion for another time. My point is simply
that, if we take seriously the possibility that certain environmen-
tal resources can scaffold the emergence of extended emotions –
as an increasing number of philosophers and cognitive scientists
are inclined to do – we ought to take seriously the possibility that
music is a particularly powerful example an emotion-extending
resource.
Few would dispute that music plays a powerful role in our
everyday lives. Its ubiquity and enduring popularity testiﬁes to
its ongoing impact; without music, our lives would, indeed, be
greatly impoverished. But if something like the above story is true,
the loss of music would not only diminish their esthetic quality
but, additionally, our capacities as emotional agents. Thankfully,
we still have music – and as such, a musically extended mind.
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